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Introduction
Demand and supply analysis in …sheries has been associated with instabilities and multiple equilibria, both in the context of an open access …shery and a socially optimal …shery. 1 The source of instability is the emergence of a backward bending supply curve which is the consequence of biological over…shing that occurs when e¤ort expands beyond the level corresponding to the maximum sustainable yield. The combination of a standard downward sloping demand curve with the backward bending supply curve can produce an odd number of interchanging locally stable and locally unstable market equilibria in open access …sheries. There exist locally stable equilibria corresponding to high price and low harvesting, which can be seen as an indication of over…shing. It is interesting to note that a similar picture can emerge even in …shery that is managed in a socially optimal way. The discounted supply curve is also backward bending for positive discount rates. As a result, there are demand conditions under which multiple equilibria and instabilities are present even in optimally controlled …sheries.
The problems caused by the emergence of instabilities and over…shing in …sheries are further intensi…ed by uncertainty, which is an important aspect of resource economics. Uncertainty in this context can be associated with the evolution of the resource stock 2 or with demand conditions. Thus both supply and demand shocks could disturb a locally stable …shery and lead to instabilities and over…shing. As Clark (1990) points out, many stock-recruitment relationships are poorly understood and di¢cult to estimate given the exist-1 See for example Clark (1990) . 2 See for example Conrad and Clark (1988, Ch. 5) , McDonald and Hanf (1992) , Clark (1990, Ch. 11) , Danielson (2002) , Tu and Wilman (1992) , Conrad (2000, Ch. 7) , Weitzman (2002) , Androkovich and K.R.Stollery (1989). ing data, which in most cases is of low quality. As a result regulation based on mispeci…ed biological dynamics might be ine¤ective in achieving the desired targets. This brings into the picture the issue of scienti…c uncertainty and its e¤ects on …shery management.
Our use of the term uncertainty refers to cases where the possible outcomes are known but the decision maker is unable to assign unique probabilities. The possibility of multiple prior distributions has largely been absent from recent economic literature, although it is often a more appropriate setting (see Woodward and Bishop (1997) ). Introducing an axiom of uncertainty aversion, as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , a maximin model is obtained where the optimal choice maximizes utility for the worst probability distribution in a given set. be desirable.
Managing a …shery in this context suggests formulating the management problem as a robust control problem along the lines developed in Hansen and Sargent (2001a) , Hansen and Sargent (2003) . The objective is to choose a harvesting rule that will work, in the sense of preventing instabilities and over…shing, under a range of di¤erent model speci…cations of the stockrecruitment equation. Robust control can be directly related to uncertainty aversion and precaution, and as Hansen and Sargent (2001b) explicitly state "a preference for robustness induces context-speci…c precaution".
The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of scienti…c uncertainty and the potentially induced instabilities and overexploitation in …sheries by introducing robust control methodologies in …shery management. Our main …nding is that by an appropriate choice of the robustness parameter, which is a parameter indicating preference for robustness, a regulator that manages a …shery for the social optimum could eliminate multiple equilibria instabilities and potential over…shing. The robust harvesting rules that lead to a unique equilibrium can be used to design decentralized regulation with policy instruments such as transferable quota or landing fees.
Bionomic Instabilities in Fishery Management 4
We begin by considering a standard …shery model where biomass evolves deterministically according to
This section follows Clark (1990, section 5.2) , and will serve as background for the development of robust control methodology in the following section.
5 where x (t) is …sh biomass, h (t) denotes the harvest rate and F (x (t)) is the growth function for stock-recruitment. One common example is the logistic growth function, where F (x) = rx (1 ¡ x=k) : Biomass stock for the maximum sustainable yield is de…ned as x msy = arg max x F (x) ; while x k : F (x k ) = 0; x k > 0 denotes the carrying capacity biomass. Let unit harvest cost, c (x (t)) be a nonincreasing function of the …sh stock x: Then for any price p; the pro…t ‡ow is determined as
The open access supply in equilibrium is determined by the conditions
Solving (4) for x and substituting into (3) we obtain equilibrium supply
open access is determined as:
where p = P (h) is the inverse demand curve. Typical bell-shaped growth functions together with stock e¤ects on harvest cost and a positive discount rate may give rise to a backward bending supply curve. Combined with a downward sloping demand curve, this could induce multiple equilibria. With three equilibria, the middle one indicates bionomic instability while one of the locally stable equilibria indicates over…shing with low equilibrium harvesting at a relatively high price.
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Multiple equilibria could be the result of prevailing demand conditions; or could arise from demand shocks.
5 t is dropped to simplify notation.
See for example …gure 5.11 in Clark (1990) , for logistic growth and unit cost equal to 
To analyze socially optimal …shery management we introduce a social planner or a regulator maximizing net surplus de…ned as
where
The welfare maximization problem is de…ned as:
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is:
with optimality conditions
along with biomass evolution (6) and the transversality condition at in…nity.
Di¤erentiating (8) with respect to time and substituting into (9) we obtain the dynamic system that characterizes the optimal paths of harvest and …sh stock. The behavior of harvest is given by
whereas stock behaves according to (6). The deterministic steady state equilibrium is de…ned as _ h = _ x = 0: At the steady state, market equilibrium is characterized by
7 which describe demand, supply, and biological equilibrium respectively. Solving the stock equilibrium equation of (11); market equilibrium when the …sh-ery is optimally managed is de…ned as
The discounted supply curve determined by (11) For the _ h 1 = 0 isocline there is a unique steady state which is saddle point stable at M. However, a demand shock could shift this isocline to _ h s = 0 and induce multiple equilibria, at M 1 ; M 2 ; and M 3 ; with the middle one being unstable and M 3 indicating over…shing. Furthermore, if the benchmark model for stock evolution is misspeci…ed, it is possible for a worse than estimated model for the stock-recruitment relationship F (x) to be realized. Under demand shocks and misspeci…cation of the stock-recruitment relationship both the _ x = 0 isocline and the _ h = 0 isocline shift and multiple equilibria could also be induced. If these shifts yield a system such as _
. It is also possible for the true model to correspond to an _ x = 0 isocline even further below _ x 2 = 0; so that an equilibrium with harvesting rule _ h 2 = 0 does not exist. This harvesting rule would lead to resource collapse under such circumstances.
The possibility of multiple equilibria at the social optimum presents problems for regulation. For example, the regulatory instruments could have been 7
See also Clark (1990) …gures 5.17 and 6.12. 8 designed to steer the system towards M 1 but due to demand shocks and/or misspeci…cation, as described above, the systems could converge, for appropriate initial conditions, to a state like E D 3 which is an over…shing steady state. To prevent regulatory complications arising from such cases a different type of regulation is required. The idea behind the robust control methodology, as applied in this paper to …shery management, is to help design rules which under the worst possible scenario for the stock-recruitment relationship will prevent instabilities, steady state multiple equilibria and biological over…shing.
Robust Control and Fishery Management
To develop the robust control methodology we introduce uncertainty in the stock-recruitment equation. Let (-; F; G) be a complete probability space, and let x t = x (!; t) ; h t = h (!; t) be the stochastic processes for the …sh biomass and harvesting, respectively. Moreover, let B t = B (!; t) be a Wiener process, E (dB t ) = 0, var (dB t ) = dt.
The stochastic social optimization problem for the …shery can be de…ned as the choice of a nonanticipating harvesting process h (!; t) that maximizes the expected value of net surplus, subject to the constraints imposed by 9 species growth rate:
where x t is the state variable and h t is the control variable of the stochastic control problem.
In equation (14) the term F (x t ) ¡ h t represents the expected change in the …sh biomass at any given point in time, while the term ¾dB t is the random amount of biomass change, with zero mean and variance ¾ 2 : In this setup, which is a typical stochastic control problem, the manager is assumed to know the behavior of stochastic shocks well enough to fully trust the characterization of the probability distribution implied by (14). This basic assumption leads to a decision on optimal harvest paths. However, it is quite possible (indeed likely, given natural system characteristics and information gaps) that the distribution is only an estimate, so that there is a degree of uncertainty attached not just to the speci…c realization of the random shock but also to the distribution itself. In other words, the planner might want to consider his own doubts about the model he is using to represent randomness. The basic assumption is that species biomass ‡uctuates continuously and that these stochastic in ‡uences are adequately represented by Wiener processes. There are two essentially di¤erent types of uncertainty involved. Chevé and Congar (2000) refer to these as risk (not knowing the precise value the shock will take) and imprecision (not being sure of the model).
are no concerns about robustness to model misspesi…cation. Otherwise, these concerns for robustness to model misspeci…cation are re ‡ected by a family of stochastic perturbations to the Brownian motion fB t : t¸0g : The perturbation distorts the probabilities G implied by (14) and replaces G by another probability measure Q: The main idea is that stochastic processes under Q will be di¢cult to distinguish from G using a …nite amount of data. The perturbed model is constructed by replacing B t in (14) with
where fz t : t¸0g is a Brownian motion and fR t : t¸0g is a measurable drift distortion. Changes in the distribution of B t will be parametrized as drift distortions to a …xed Brownian motion fz t : t¸0g : The distortions will be zero under the measure G; in which case B t and z t coincide.
Now the social planner's concerns about misspeci…cation of the model describing the evolution of …sh biomass can be expressed using (17) to write the distorted model
Thus, in the …shery management problem under model misspeci…cation, equation (14) is replaced by (18). Now, following Hansen et al. (2002) , the corresponding multiplier robust control model for the …shery can be written as:
that chooses the "worst case distortion" to the stock-recruitment relationship.
The robustness parameter µ can be interpreted as the Lagrangian multiplier associated with an entropy constraint, which de…nes the maximum speci…-cation error in the stock-recruitment relationship that the social planner is willing to accept.
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A value µ = +1 signi…es no preference for robustness in the sense that the decision-maker has no doubts on the model, while lower values for µ indicate such a preference and such doubts.
Note that a speci…c choice of a maximum speci…cation error that the regulator is willing to consider implies a speci…c choice of µ: Conversely, a speci…c choice of the robustness parameter µ implies a speci…c maximum speci…ca-tion error. Thus a desire to be robust, as re ‡ected in µ; can be translated to a maximum acceptable speci…cation error and vice-versa. In…nite µ implies that the regulator is not willing to consider any speci…cation error and regards the benchmark model as a good model, or rather, as the model. Relative entropy is a measure of the distance between the distributions G and Q. It must be limited, otherwise they would be distinguishable. More rigorously, the entropy constraint is Hansen et al. (2002) ). Then µ can be interpreted as the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint robust problem max (18), (15), (16) and the above entropy constraint, with´being the maximum speci…cation error that the regulator is willing to consider. As Hansen et al. (2002) show, the constraint problem and the multiplier problem are equivalent.
A solution for game (20) for any given value of the robustness parameter µ will determine the socially optimal robust harvesting policy.
Robust harvesting rules
The optimality conditions associated with the optimization in the right hand side of (20) imply
Equation (21) is the usual result that at the optimal harvest the net marginal bene…t of an additional unit of catch must be equal to the resource cost, whereas equation (22) is the worst possible distortion that is admissible, which is negative as expected and depends on µ: When µ is large, R is small and the benchmark model is a good approximation. More speci…cally, when µ ! 1 there is no distortion at all and the model yields the same solution as the typical optimal stochastic control model.
Going through the required derivations (see Appendix A), we obtain the solution for the evolution of harvesting (in expected terms), which depends on the distortion R :
11 t is dropped again to simplify notation.
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substituting the worst case distortion R from …rst order condition (22), we have the di¤erential equation governing the change of the expected value of robust harvesting along the optimal path.
Likewise, the evolution of the expected value of biomass, after substituting R from equation (22) into equation (18) and taking expected values, becomes
Equations (24) and (25) summarize the evolution of the expected values of harvesting and biomass under socially optimal management with robust control.
Robust Equilibrium: Uniqueness and Regulation
In equilibrium (1=dt) Edh = (1=dt) Edx = 0: Using (24) and recalling that U 0 (h) = P (h) ; the socially optimal expected steady state harvest under robust control will be determined by:
Under certainty ¾ = 0, in which case (26) is reduced to the well known rule for optimal …shery management, equation (11). Similarly, the management rule under "typical", risk-type uncertainty in stock-recruitment, without a preference for robustness, is obtained by setting ¾ 6 = 0 and µ ! 1:
Solving (26) for P (h) the robust equilibrium market clearing conditions 14 become:
where condition (28) indicates stationary biomass, x µ (h; µ). Substituting into (27) we obtain the robust supply curve p = S µ (h; µ) : Then market equilibrium is obtained as:
Setting µ ! 1 we obtain the corresponding equilibrium condition under risk. It is interesting to note that the simpler type of randomness (assuming a known distribution) a¤ects only the supply curve (27), but not the stock equilibrium condition (28). However, once we allow for model uncertainty the stock equilibrium condition is also a¤ected by the robustness parameter, so that both harvest and stock expected paths are modi…ed. The chosen equilibrium will depend on ¾ (which is assumed to be exogenous) as well as µ. Now the interesting question is how to choose an appropriate value for this parameter. One possibility is to use the detection error probabilities associated with a given sample of observations for biomass evolution, calculating likelihood ratios between di¤erent worst case distributions and the benchmark (see Hansen and Sargent (2003) ).
Alternatively, the discussion in section 2 suggests that the dynamic …shery model could be associated with problems of multiple equilibria and bionomic instabilities, which suggests that µ could also be used to eliminate such problems. To make the point clear, assume that the …shery is controlled using only the benchmark model (14), which implies that µ ! 1: The dynamic system for expected harvesting and biomass is de…ned, using (23) and (25) for µ ! 1; by:
Suppose that this system has a unique equilibrium with the usual saddle point property, shown, in Figure 1 , as the intersection of _ x 1 = 0 and _ h 2 = 0
at point E. Assume now that the benchmark model is not the true one, but that the true one is a distorted model for some R D < 0: Since there are no robust control considerations by the manager, the corresponding dynamic system in expected values is given by (30) and
In this case while the (1=dt) Edh = 0 isocline remains the same, the (1=dt) Edx = 0 isocline shrinks inward, possibly as far as the _ x 2 = 0 isocline in Figure 1 ,
is su¢ciently large in absolute value, then there could be no steady state equilibrium at all and the resource might collapse. Thus controlling with the benchmark model when the distorted model is true could lead to instabilities or even resource collapse.
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The idea behind stabilization through robust control is to choose a harvesting rule such that the system has a unique equilibrium not only for the benchmark model but for the worst possible distortion R that Nature could choose. If a unique equilibrium exists under the worst possible distortion,
These e¤ects will be more profound and detrimental the faster the biomass and harvest dynamics.
we want to show that uniqueness will also hold for milder distortions of the benchmark model.
Under robust control the equilibrium harvesting and biomass are determined by (24), (25) . In this system µ can be used as a free parameter.
Therefore, it could be chosen in principle so that the system has a unique equilibrium. This idea can be explained with the help of Figure 2 , which depicts again the three equilibria that emerge from the distorted model without Figure 1 . Choosing a speci…c µ implies that the (1=dt) Edh = 0 and the (1=dt) Edx = 0 isoclines of the system (24), (25) will shift. The idea is to choose µ so that the isoclines shift to positions such as H R H R and Ax R k ; intersecting only once at point E R :
[ Figure 2 ]
Choosing µ this way implies that the preference for robustness is combined with a preference for uniqueness. A speci…c value of µ that guarantees a unique, stable equilibrium can be translated to a maximum speci…cation error that the manager or regulator is willing to accept, by recalling µ 0 s role as multiplier of the entropy constraint in the constraint problem formulation.
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Provided that uniqueness is preserved under milder distortions, the use of robust control ensures that a unique equilibrium exists for all distortions from the benchmark case to the worst one. Thus, if a milder distortion shifts Figure 2 , since the robust control solution …xes the (1=dt) Edh = 0 isocline at H R H R ; uniqueness is preserved at E M :
The uniqueness -stabilization argument used in this paper can be complementary to the detection error probability approach. For instance, it is possible that more than one value of µ achieve uniqueness, in which case detection error probabilities can provide additional input into the …nal choice.
An approach for choosing such a µ can be described as follows. Let the nonnegative values of µ for which the objective function can be larger than ¡1. The (1=dt) Edx = 0 isocline de…nes, using (25) , the curve G (x; h; µ) = 0; while the (1=dt) Edh = 0 isocline de…nes, using (24), the curve K (x; h; µ) = 0. If a µ ¤ exists such that G (x; h; µ ¤ ) = 0 and K (x; h; µ ¤ ) = 0 have a unique solution (x ¤ ; h ¤ ) ; then robust control leads to a unique equilibrium: Su¢cient conditions for the existence of such a µ can be derived.
Consider the Jacobian determinant of the system (24), (25):
where£ is the subset of values of µ for which the a solution for the system exists.
Proposition 1 If D (x; h; µ) does not change sign in A -£ µ £ then a unique robust equilibrium exists for the expected values of harvest and biomass.
For proof see Appendix B.
A possible illustration of this result can be presented with reference to Figure 2 . The uniqueness condition means that a µ ¤ is selected such that the H R H R curve cuts the horizontal axis between A and x R k ; that it is monotonic increasing at least up to x R k ; and that the intersection takes place at the non increasing part of the Ax R k curve.
14 At the equilibrium point the slope 14 An intersection could take place at the increasing part of the Ax R k curve, but additional conditions would be required to ensure uniqueness in that case. condition for the H R H R and Ax R k curves implies, using (32), that 
Proposition 2 IfD ³ x; h;R = 0´has the same sign as D (x; h; µ ¤ ) and it is monotonic inR then the uniqueness of the robust equilibrium is preserved
For proof see Appendix ??.
In terms of Figure 2 , uniqueness is obtained if the (1=dt) Edh = 0 isocline is increasing at least up to the carrying capacity of the benchmark model.
Furthermore, since Ax 
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Of course it is possible that several µ satisfy the su¢cient conditions described above. In such a case, the value for µ can be chosen to ensure the highest expected value for the robust control problem.
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More formally, among the set of µ that satisfy conditions for uniqueness and preservation of uniqueness under milder distortions, a µ ¤¤ is chosen such that:
are solutions of the robust control problem evaluated at each µ:
If a unique robust equilibrium is de…ned, the value obtained for harvesting in these conditions can be used as a robust quantity limit for designing tradable quota systems. In this case a robust quota is determined by a policy function h R t = Á (x t ) which is the function characterizing an approach path to the unique robust equilibrium. This is the path RR corresponding to the one dimensional stable manifold of the saddle point robust equilibrium, converging to E R in Figure 2 .
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This result can be related to the safe quota concept discussed in Homans and E.Wilen (1997) . They assume a quota that 15 If milder distortions are realized, updates of the policy might be possible. The analysis of the updating process for a robust rule is left for future research. 16 Given empirical data, the set of allowable µ can be narrowed down to those that generate reasonable detection error probabilities. See footnote 13.
The stable manifold or equivalently the policy function h R t = Á (x t ) can be recovered by numerical methods. Using the time elimination method, the stable manifold is determined by the solution of the di¤erential equation
with initial conditions (x ¤ ; h ¤ ) ; which is the robust steady state corresponding to E R in Figure 2 .
is a linear function of the biomass, so that the safe quota is determined as h S = max f0; c + dxg ; with c < 0; d > 0: Thus if the stock is below some minimum value then h S = 0 (as negative harvesting is obviously ruled out), while the quota is below, equal or above biological growth if x T x saf e ; respectively. In our case for each stock level the quota is "safe" in the sense that it ensures that the robust equilibrium biomass is attained in the long run even under the worst possible scenario for stock-recruitment.
It should be noted that the robust quota rule which attains a steady state biomass equilibrium for the worst possible case of the stock-recruitment 
will indicate the change in expected steady state welfare between robust and benchmark rules. Since this di¤erence is negative, it can be interpreted as the steady state cost of wanting to be robust, or to put it in a di¤erent way, as the cost of precaution.
Concluding Remarks
Bionomic instability is an inherent characteristic of …shery models induced by a backward bending supply curve. This instability emerges both in open access and in optimally controlled …sheries. Given the uncertainties associ-ated with …sheries, these instabilities could be intensi…ed by demand shocks or uncertainties associated with the stock-recruitment relationship.
In the present paper we consider the case of scienti…c uncertainty in the stock-recruitment relationship and we introduce robust control methods in …shery management. We show that robust control could act as a tool to prevent instabilities, by an appropriate choice of the robustness parameter. This is obtained by designing a rule so that the optimally managed …shery is stable under a worst possible scenario for the stock-recruitment relationship.The robust management rule can be used to design a robust quota rule that work better than typical prescriptions under uncertainty, both in the sense of maintaining stable harvests and in avoiding biomass collapse. This management rule will, however, have a cost in terms of foregone expected harvesting bene…ts.
The robust harvesting solution can be used as a basis for setting "safe"
quotas to be applied in a …shery. The question of whether and when it makes sense to update the robustness parameter as more information becomes available on stock-recruitment, and thus to update the harvesting rule accordingly, is one potencially important question which should be addressed in future research.
Finally, the basic model developed here can also be extended along different lines, such as depensation or non-linear cost e¤ects, or by considering the …shery as a dynamic game between the planner/regulator and the …sh-ermen, and seeking robust solutions with possible heterogenous preferences for robustness.
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A Derivation of optimal solution
This appendix shows how to derive equation (23).
Di¤erentiating the value function with respect to x and using (21) and (22) we obtain
is a function of the stochastic variable x we have by Ito's lemma
Using equation (18), taking expected values, and dividing by dt we obtain
Substituting in (34) and rearranging with (21), the expected evolution of the resource cost is
To express the solution in terms of the expected evolution of harvesting, apply the di¤erential operator (1=dt) Ed (¢) to (21)
We need to expand the left hand side of (38), by applying Ito's lemma to c (x) and U 0 (h); which yields the following second order expansions:
Since along the optimal path h = h (x) ; where x is a stochastic variable, using Ito's lemma once again yields
When taking the expected value, terms of order higher than t go to zero, so
and (40) becomes
Using equations (39) and (42) to plug into (38), and recalling (37) we …nally
B Proof of Proposition 1
We locate su¢cient conditions for the existence of a
The proof follows from the proof of proposition 1. All theD ³ x; h;R´deter- 
